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3Introduction 
Iceland has a long history of depending
heavily on its fishing industry to support its
economy. Prior to the 1960s, the majority of
people were employed in fishing-related sectors.
However, having so many Icelanders with jobs
in the same industry presented significant
risk. Relying on circumstances as fluctuating as
weather and fish stock, the economy was often
unstable. Thus, Iceland was welcoming when
the aluminum company Alcan showed an inter-
est in the country’s cheap sources of electric-
ity. By 1966, Iceland saw the opening of its
first aluminum smelter. The aluminum indus-
try’s rapid expansion and its plant openings in
the late 1990s helped drive Iceland’s economic
growth.  
Today, approximately 45 years after the
opening of the first aluminum plant, Iceland
faces a problem similar to the fishing era: heavy
dependence on one industry. As the fishing
industry lies stagnant, unable to grow because
of quotas placed on fish harvests, the aluminum
industry continues to expand at an accelerating
pace. Because this industry contributes a larger
percentage to the Icelandic economy every year,
overdependence on it is increasing, much as
with the fishing industry prior to 1966. In 2008,
aluminum became the single largest source of
exports from Iceland. Although this spurs
growth, it also creates dependence and an expec-
tation to constantly enlarge aluminum output
to keep the economy going.  
Beyond their common contributions to
the Icelandic economy, there are many differ-
ences between the fishing and aluminum indus-
tries. For example, all aluminum smelters in
Iceland are owned by foreign companies
whereas all fishing is owned by Icelandic citi-
zens. The two industries also have very differ-
ent market structures. While the fishing indus-
try is highly competitive, aluminum is
concentrated in a few large firms. These dif-
ferences present challenges both new and old.
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4On one hand, Iceland has dealt with the situa-
tion of overdependence in the past. By limit-
ing overfishing via quotas, Iceland was effec-
tively able to restrict the growth of the fishing
industry. Moreover, by attracting the aluminum
industry, Iceland diversified its previously lim-
ited economic portfolio. On the other hand, if
Iceland were to attempt to impose restrictions
on foreign owners for fear of overdependence,
it may strain those relationships. If restriction
became stifling enough, the foreign firms could
end up looking elsewhere to continue their
operations.
This article explores the aluminum indus-
try’s current and future situations in Iceland.
First, a cost-benefit analysis assesses the value
of the aluminum industry to Iceland. Second,
the instabilities that the industry can cause in
the country are examined. The article concludes
with a proposed course of action and identifies
potential opportunities beyond the aluminum
industry that Iceland should consider. 
A Brief History of the Aluminum
Industry in Iceland
Since Nordic explorers first settled approx-
imately a millennium ago, natural hot springs
have provided Iceland renewable energy. More
recently, emerging technologies enabled further
exploitation of renewable resources and trans-
formed Iceland’s utilization of energy. The
first municipal hydropower station was built
in 1921, followed in 1969 by Iceland’s first geot-
hermal power plant. (“Bjarnarflag—Iceland’s
First…”) Hydropower and geothermal power
became major sources of clean energy, replac-
ing coal and oil for electricity and heat. Ice-
landers realized the resource value of inexpen-
sive energy, and—in contrast to their
longstanding strict controls against foreign
ownership in fishing—began to open up to
the potential opportunities that foreign
investors seeking cheap energy could provide. 
The companies most interested in cheap
electric rates are those for whom electricity is
a large and vital part of production. The smelt-
ing of aluminum is an extremely energy-inten-
sive process. For an average aluminum plant
in the United States, energy makes up roughly
a third (depending on prices) of the total cost.
(Rocks and Minerals) Mined bauxite contains
approximately 50% alumina, a compound of
aluminum and oxygen, which is chemically dis-
solved and extracted from the bauxite. Then, an
enormous electrical current, approximately
100,000 to 320,000 amps, is run through giant
pots of molten alumina. (Rio Tinto Alcan) The
end product, aluminum, is tapped from the
pot and cast into aluminum ingots.
Before aluminum, Iceland shied away
from large-scale foreign investment in its econ-
omy. This was especially true in fishing; govern-
ment-mandated restrictions declared that only
Icelandic citizens could own ships. (Gunnarson)
Iceland did not hold this attitude toward energy-
intensive industries because the Ministry of
Industry saw an opportunity to diversify an
economy too heavily reliant on one industry
while simultaneously exporting Iceland’s abun-
dant energy resources, which are difficult to
export directly.
Like most Nordic countries, Iceland
depends heavily on exports. In 2010, exports
made up 39 percent of the GDP. (The World
Factbook) At the same time, Iceland does not
have a wide variety of goods to export. In 1968,
a year before aluminum operations began in Ice-
land, 86.5 percent of exports were marine prod-
ucts. Agricultural products were a distant sec-
ond at only 8.8 percent of total exports.
(Statistics Iceland) With such a concentrated
source of income, Iceland’s economy as a whole
was subject to volatility. The source of this
volatility was mainly weather and ocean con-
ditions. If ocean conditions were especially
harsh one season, and not as many fish were
caught, negative shock waves could be sent
through the entire economy of the country.
To combat this problem, in 1961 the Icelandic
Ministry of Industry formed the Industrial
Development Committee. (Skulason) Its pur-
pose was to figure out the best industries for
which low-cost energy might be attractive for
expanding. When the aluminum industry began
to show an interest in Iceland, the committee
took advantage. As recognition grew of the
significantly cheaper electricity present in Ice-
land, combined with the Icelandic government’s
initiative for economic diversification, Alcan
(now known as Rio Tinto Alcan) began negoti-
ations with the Icelandic government. By 1966,
construction on Iceland’s first aluminum
smelter had begun.
In 1969, Alcan, a company based in
Canada, began operations with a capacity to
produce 33,000 tons per year.  Nearly 30 years
later, in 1998, U.S.-based Century Aluminum
opened the second smelter in Iceland, and in
2007, U.S.-based Alcoa opened the third and
most recent smelter. Currently the three alu-
minum smelters in Iceland combined have a
maximum capacity of 791,000 tons per year.
Expansion continues as Alcoa is planning to
construct another smaller smelter, and both Rio
Tinto Alcan and Century Aluminum are plan-
ning to expand their current facilities. If these
plans come to fruition, ultimate production
capability of the country could increase by 51
percent to 1,265,000 tons per year by 2015.
(Kristofersson et al.) On the surface, this seems
a win-win situation for everyone involved. Ice-
land achieves greater economic stability, new
jobs, and tax revenue while aluminum compa-
nies pay relatively low energy costs. However,
by weighing the real economic benefits and
costs of the aluminum industry, the industry’s
planned expansion can be evaluated.
Overview of Macroeconomic Growth
Spurred by the Aluminum Industry1
Market Structure
The first step in understanding the cost-
benefit analysis of aluminum smelting in Ice-
land is to understand the overall market struc-
ture of the industry. Aluminum smelting, like
most large-scale manufacturing industries, has
huge economies of scale because of large capi-
tal costs needed for massive and specialized
machinery. Other inputs of production, such as
labor, electricity, and alumina, have compara-
tively constant unit costs. Therefore, the aver-
age unit cost of running a plant can be reduced
by producing more aluminum for a given
amount of capital. If a facility expands produc-
tion output, there is more profit generated per
plant. Additionally, the high up-front capital
costs create a significant market entrance bar-
rier and deterrent for potential competitors.
Altogether, only 30 different companies own
all of the aluminum smelting facilities in the
world. (Alcor Technology) The two biggest com-
panies with operations in Iceland, Alcoa and Rio
Tinto Alcan, each control approximately 10 per-
cent of the entire world market. (Alcoa) This
makes for a concentrated market in which a
small number of companies control a large por-
tion of world production. 
Many of these market features also apply
to the hydroelectric power business. Because
aluminum facilities are large and usually
expected to grow larger, hydropower dams with
the sole purpose of providing electricity to
aluminum plants have been built in Iceland.
Currently, these projects are controlled by
Landsvirkjun, the national power company of
Iceland, which was initially founded in order
to provide electricity to foreign-owned power-
intensive industries. (“Landsvirkjun’s History”)
Like the aluminum industry, hydroelectric
plants require large amounts of capital, and thus
are subject to economies of scale as well. 
With power plants and aluminum
smelters requiring large capital investments,
it is in the interest of both parties to negotiate
contracts for as long term as possible for long-
term income and cost stability. Current con-
tracts between Landsvirkjun and the three
aluminum companies have been written so that
they last for 40 years. Although the specific
details of the contracts are not public infor-
mation, it is known that the price of electric-
ity moves based on the world price of aluminum
and that renegotiations of price specifics occur
at the halfway point (20 years) of the con-
tracts. 
When the Ministry of Industry chooses
to undertake an aluminum smelting project,
it must be prepared for long-term involvement.
By committing, the industry has the security of
long-term prices while the country gains the secu-
rity of long-term income and job creation. This is
part of the reason that aluminum has become
such a deep-rooted industry in Iceland. With a big
industry in a small country and long-term part-
nerships, dependence on the aluminum indus-
try has grown and continues to grow. In fact, it
has grown so much that in terms of macroeco-
nomic impact, aluminum now outweighs fishing
as the most important industry in Iceland.
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1A large portion of the discussion in this section
was taken from the report by Kristofersson et al., “The Effect
of Power Intensive Industrial Developments on the Icelandic
Economy,” and from Statistics Iceland.
GDP Analysis
One of the best ways to gauge macro-
economic effects is to examine the industry’s
effect on Iceland’s GDP.  Aluminum constituted
39 percent of all exports and 17.5 percent of Ice-
land’s GDP in 2008. In that year, aluminum
passed fishing products as a percentage of
GDP for the first time in the country’s history.
One of the main reasons for the unequal growth
trends is the implementation of the fishing
quota system in the 1970s. By limiting the num-
ber of fish that commercial fishing vessels
may catch, the quota system reigned in the
growth of the industry in order to protect the
crashing fish stocks. Since then, the industry
growth rates for aluminum relative to fishing
have diverged. As Figure 1 shows, on average
during this period, fishing has declined and alu-
minum expanded as a percentage of the value of
exports until 2008 when aluminum reached
approximately the same level as fishing. 
In order to fully evaluate the industry,
value-adjusted GDP must be taken into account.
Value-adjusted GDP also incorporates the neg-
ative effects that the aluminum industry may
have on GDP. The production of aluminum
ingots requires importing the raw material alu-
mina. Iceland would have no need to import it
if not producing aluminum. The importing of
any product has a negative effect on the balance
of trade; thus, alumina has a negative effect
on Iceland’s overall GDP. Alumina imports con-
tributed a negative effect of 5.6 percent of
GDP in 2008. By combining beneficial and neg-
ative effects, the value-adjusted GDP of alu-
minum is revealed to be 11.9 percent in that
year. The net effect of the aluminum industry
on the GDP can be seen in Figure 2. 
Although aluminum smelting in the
country has grown rapidly over the past decade,
with all three firms planning capacity expan-
sions, it shows signs of accelerating even more
over the next 5 years. So, economic dependence
on the industry will also continue to grow.
Yet, reducing dependence on one industry, fish-
ing, is exactly why the aluminum smelting
industry was brought to Iceland in the first
place. GDP, however, is not the sole indicator
of economic value. Another consideration when
determining the costs and benefits of the alu-
minum industry is profit analysis.  
Profit Analysis
When the aluminum industry is making
profits, where do the profits go? A small percent-
age of profits is reinvested into maintaining cap-
ital but the majority leaves the country in the
form of dividends to foreign owners. When
dividends leave Iceland, they are a negative
export in the balance of trade, reducing the
industry’s overall economic benefit. 
Not all profits flow out of the country. Ice-
landic corporate taxes also play a role in where
profits go. The agenda in the mid 1990s was
to privatize more business in Iceland. During
this time, the national budget was success-
fully balanced and the passing of business-
friendly legislation was continued. From 1990
to 2003, legislation reduced the corporate tax
from 50 percent to 18 percent. (Ólafsson) With
the decrease in taxes, previously unprofitable
expansion projects became attractive options.
Thus the mid 1990s and 2000s were a period
of rapid expansion in aluminum production.
As shown in Figure 3, the lowering of taxes actu-
ally spurred an increase in government rev-
enues. In other words, by lowering the corpo-
rate tax rate, the Icelandic government has been
able to effectively spur growth and extract more
tax revenue from the aluminum industry and
labor taxes on newly created jobs.
Conclusions Based on Cost-
Benefit Analysis
A cost-benefit analysis of the aluminum
industry in Iceland helps reveal exactly what this
industry means to the country. As shown by
export and GDP percentages, it has become a
large and deeply rooted part of the Iceland econ-
omy. Further analysis of net GDP reveals that
its overall economic benefits are not as large
as they first appear. Additionally, the Icelandic
government has found an effective way to
extract more tax revenue from the industry
through the lowering of corporate taxes. How-
ever, as the aluminum industry’s relative size
continues to grow, some of the risks associ-
ated with the industry become more impor-
tant to the health of the whole Icelandic econ-
omy. Therefore, this analysis turns to the risks
associated with the aluminum industry.
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7Figure 1
Exports by Category, 1950–2009, as Percentage of Exports
Source: Statistics Iceland.
Figure 2
Net Effect of the Aluminum Industry on the
Balance of Trade as a Percentage of GDP
Source: Statistics Iceland.
Rio Tinto Century
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8Economic Instabilities Caused by the
Aluminum Industry
As large an export as aluminum is for Ice-
land, the total is but a small fraction of the
world’s overall aluminum production of 40 mil-
lion tons per year. Because Iceland only pro-
duces 2 percent of the world’s aluminum, it
alone has little leverage in swaying market
aluminum prices one way or another. Because
of this, and the nature of aluminum as a com-
modity, aluminum producers in Iceland must
take prices as they are set by world markets as
a whole. Although aluminum is not nearly as
volatile as, for example, fishing or agriculture,
it is still susceptible to market fluctuations in
price. As an export, aluminum is also suscep-
tible to currency fluctuations because of the
structure of the contracts between aluminum
companies and Landsvirkjun. With the growing
scale of the industry, these risks are becoming
magnified to the country as a whole.
Dependence on Aluminum Prices
Theoretically, aluminum plants have
polar opposite production options: run at full
capacity producing as much as possible to
keep average unit costs low, or produce noth-
ing.  As long as the price of aluminum is high
enough to cover all variable costs (largely labor,
raw material, and electricity inputs), then plants
will continue to produce at full capacity. If, how-
ever, aluminum were to fall below a critical price
level where variable costs were no longer cov-
ered, management would choose to produce
nothing. Because of economies of scale, there is
only a small number of large plants. Even if only
one of the three plants in Iceland were to shut
down, a large number of jobs and incomes
would be lost, and overall GDP would drop. It is
difficult to predict exactly how many people
would be affected, but two job types—manufac-
turing and energy—would be hit hardest (Fig-
ure 4) if an aluminum plant shut down. Man-
ufacturing applies directly to the aluminum
smelters, whereas energy providers would be
hurt due to loss of business with the aluminum
Figure 3
Iceland’s Corporate Tax Rate vs. Corporate Tax Revenue
Source: Gissurarson and Mitchell, p. 4.
Corporate Taxes as a
Percent of GDP
(Left Scale)
Corporate Tax Rate
(Right Scale)
9facilities. As indicated in Figure 4, however, wip-
ing out all 3000 or so jobs in both these sec-
tors would only amount to approximately 2 per-
cent of the workforce. Not shown in Figure 4 are
all the secondary jobs and economic activity
spurred by the aluminum plants. Building a new
plant creates many new jobs and sources of
income external to the plant itself, including
construction of infrastructure near a plant,
freight transportation of inputs and outputs, and
even increases in local shop sales. All of these
would also be greatly affected if an aluminum
plant were to close. Independent economic
analyses of the industry suggest that for each
direct aluminum job, there are actually 3 to
3.5 times that many jobs created in the country
(NYSIR & UARI), closer to 7 percent or 10,000
jobs affected by the aluminum industry. The
chance of aluminum prices dropping far enough
for a shutdown to happen anytime soon is highly
unlikely, so this is not a short-term risk; how-
ever, it is a potential long-term risk. (Kristofers-
son et al.)  
Even if unlikely, a shutdown was a real
fear for Icelanders when initially considering
starting the aluminum industry in their coun-
try. Therefore, they came up with a way to hedge
against the risk. Contracts between aluminum
companies and electricity providers in Iceland
were designed with a floating price of electric-
ity. That is, the price of electricity moves as
the price of aluminum, in U.S. dollars, moves.
This assures that aluminum companies’ variable
cost in electricity shifts with the price of alu-
minum. Additionally, all payments between
smelters and power companies are in U.S. dol-
lars to avoid any exchange rate risk the foreign-
owned aluminum companies could face. This in
turn transfers much of the exchange rate risk
and aluminum price fluctuation risk onto
Landsvirkjun. For all intents and purposes, this
should keep aluminum smelters permanently
open. Iceland has chosen to forge contracts that
sacrifice a certain amount of short-term sta-
bility in income from electricity prices to avoid
possible long-term aluminum industry shut-
down. Although this is reassuring for the long
term, it does inject some uncertainty in the
short term, as recently witnessed with the
economic collapse of 2008. Because production
continued at full capacity, even though demand
sharply dropped, aluminum prices dropped from
$1.50/lb to $0.58/lb, a decrease of approximately
60 percent, in a matter of 5 months. (Kitco) The
way Landsvirkjun handles this type of risk is dis-
cussed in the next section. 
Risk Assessment of Landsvirkjun2
Landsvirkjun, Iceland’s national hydro-
electric energy producer, produces three times
as much electricity for use by the aluminum
industry than for all other uses in the entire
nation combined. (“Landsvirkjun’s History”)
Because of this, foreign aluminum owners hold
substantial bargaining power to forge contracts
that pass much of their risk onto Iceland. So,
Landsvirkjun takes steps to hedge against both
aluminum price risk and exchange rate risk.
Typical of commodities, world aluminum prices
vary quite a bit. The direct contractual link to
electricity prices in turn means that fluctuation
in the profits of Landsvirkjun is not uncommon. 
In addition, there are two sources of
currency exchange rate risk. One is the risk
from foreign loans used to finance the
hydropower facilities. The effective interest rate
on loans can change based on exchange rates.
Landsvirkjun prefers the Icelandic króna to
strengthen against these currencies, making the
loans less expensive. The second type of
exchange rate risk is in those Landsvirkjun
operating costs that are in króna (e.g., pay-
roll). Although a relatively small portion of
expenses, what this means is that Landsvirkjun
is also susceptible to risk occasioned by króna-
dollar exchange rate fluctuations.
Because electricity companies are pub-
lic, there is additional pressure on them to
maintain steady income rates. During the finan-
cial crisis of 2008, this was especially important,
so different efforts have been made to make sure
Landsvirkjun has a stable cash flow. To battle
currency fluctuations, currency swaps have been
utilized heavily. Loans have been taken out in
at least five different currencies, and
Landsvirkjun holds currency swaps in all of
them against the króna. To battle aluminum
price fluctuations, Landsvirkjun utilizes dif-
ferent types of financial derivatives.
Landsvirkjun has been using futures contracts
2A majority of the information in this section comes
from Gudmundsdottir and Halldorsson. Annual Report
2009. Landsvirkjun.
and exchange-rate derivatives to lock in prices
for aluminum no matter which direction the
market moves.  In 2010, Landsvirkjun was given
authority by the Icelandic government to hedge
100 percent of its electricity output with alu-
minum futures contracts due to unstable con-
ditions in the wake of the financial crisis. How-
ever, the allowed hedging percentage of
electricity output will be reduced over the
next ten years. If the economy improves, mar-
kets should be more stable by 2020; this decreas-
ing hedge percentage makes Landsvirkjun more
susceptible to fluctuation risk. 
Conclusion about Risks Presented
by the Aluminum Industry
Although the aluminum industry was ini-
tially brought in to stabilize the economy, it is
not without risks of its own. This is especially
true because the aluminum companies have
shed onto Landsvirkjun a large portion of their
operational risk, hedging against which can
become costly in a volatile market such as
aluminum. Ultimately, two big sectors, alu-
minum and energy, are tied to aluminum prices.
But because of employment multiplying effects
and taxes, employment and government rev-
enue also become a function of aluminum
prices. Altogether, this doubles down the bet on
aluminum for sustaining the economy. Diversi-
fying the Icelandic industry sector would be a
good way to decrease the influence of aluminum
prices on the Icelandic economy.
Diversifying Iceland’s Energy-
Intensive Sector
In short, aluminum companies have been
able to transfer much of their risk to Iceland.
Additionally, due to their continually growing
size, they are concentrating economic activity.
To mitigate the risks and concentration, indus-
try diversification is desirable for the stability of
the national economy. Because the risks associ-
ated with various industries differ, a mix of
industries diminishes the negative impact on
the country as a whole if one fails. With the
fast growth of the aluminum industry, Iceland
is, however, “putting all [its] eggs in one bas-
10
Figure 4
Percent of Workforce by Economic Activity
Sources: Kristofersson et al. and Statistics Iceland.
ket,” according to Andri Magnason, a writer and
filmmaker critical of the industry. (Chu) What
can Iceland reasonably do moving forward?
Despite size constraints, a few options that Ice-
land has begun to pursue can help steer its econ-
omy in a more sustainable long-term direction.
Capping the Aluminum Industry
If allowed to grow unchecked, the alu-
minum industry might begin to dwarf the
fishing industry, and the entire economy could
be at the whim of fluctuations within one mar-
ket again. In order to prevent aluminum from
becoming too large, the Icelandic government
could put restrictions on growth. It is not sug-
gested that the government ask the industry
to stop expansion altogether but instead throt-
tle down its recently accelerated growth. If
this is done in conjunction with diversifica-
tion of the economy by bringing in other power-
intensive industries, then the relative depend-
ence on aluminum would diminish but its
substantial importance in the economy main-
tained.
So far, Iceland has not taken direct action
in this regard, because it is often difficult to
impose these types of regulations once an indus-
try is in place. Also, there is a growing envi-
ronmentalist and anticorporation movement
among the populace that is asking the govern-
ment to stop or reduce the building/expansion
of aluminum plants and hydroelectric dams.
(Grist) Some groups, like singer Björk’s activist
organization, Náttúra, are looking to spur new
smaller industries to use Iceland’s energy rather
than heavy industry. (Kanter) Other groups, like
the Iceland Nature Conservation Association,
are concerned with protecting the environment
from hydropower development altogether. It
is difficult to know for sure, but as pressure from
these groups mounts, the Icelandic government
may become a more active listener to these con-
cerns. As with the aluminum industry, it
becomes harder to impose restrictions as polit-
ical power and size of industry grows. It may
be worth planning and easing into restrictions
now before new industries come to Iceland, if
that is the direction that the country wants to
take.
Moving Away from Overdependence
on the Aluminum Industry
Methods that Iceland can use to allevi-
ate overdependence are decoupling electricity
contracts from aluminum prices, diversifying
the manufacturing sector, and bringing other
energy-intensive industries to Iceland. A new
pricing strategy recently implemented in con-
tract negations between Rio Tinto Alcan and
Landsvirkjun helps balance the risk sharing.
As of October 2010, Landsvirkjun and Alcan Ice-
land have removed the link of the price of power
to the price of aluminum. Instead, it is now
linked to the U.S. consumer price index.
(“Landsvirkjun and Alcan …”) This is
Landsvirkjun’s first successful attempt at creat-
ing a more balanced risk sharing model, which
it hopes to achieve eventually as well with the
other two aluminum companies in Iceland. 
Another way the country could reduce
aluminum dependence is by attracting other
energy-intensive industries. Within the past
decade Iceland has been diversifying itself
through software production, biotechnology,
and tourism. (The World Factbook) Iceland
sits on an enormous potential for cheap elec-
tricity: Why not hedge the bet on aluminum
by inviting other types of energy-intensive
industries that would love a chance for cheap
electricity?
Landsvirkjun has begun to move in this
direction. Currently, there are five medium-
sized, non-aluminum manufacturing plants in
Iceland producing fertilizer, cement, rock wool,
algin, and salt. (Randburg) These manufactur-
ing facilities not only utilize domestic sources
of electricity but also gather their needed raw
materials locally. Thus Iceland does not need to
import raw materials as for aluminum. Individ-
ually these sectors are small relative to alu-
minum in both size and income potential, but
as a collective, they can be regarded as a large
industry. Aluminum alone constitutes 33 per-
cent of the value of all manufacturing in Iceland
whereas all other manufacturing processes com-
bined (other than food/fish products) constitute
only 18 percent. (Statistics Iceland) However,
the number of non-aluminum industries is
growing as Landsvirkjun is actively seeking to
recruit more small energy-intensive indus-
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tries through cheap electricity prices. For
instance, in February 2011, Landsvirkjun signed
a contract with Icelandic Silicon Corporation to
provide 65 MW of power to its new 40,000-ton
silicon production facility, which is expected
to create approximately 100 jobs. (“Landsvirkjun
and Icelandic …”) Continued pursuit of these
types of industries and agreements is one of
Landvirkjun’s main objectives moving forward
in order to reduce relative dependence on alu-
minum.  
One new large-scale industry that
Landsvirkjun is pursuing is the data server
industry. This industry deals in recording and
serving out information for a wide array of busi-
nesses. Companies will spend an additional 40
to 60 percent of the basic cost of running a
server just in cooling them down to keep them
from overheating. Although big Internet com-
panies, like Google, dominate this industry with
the enormous amounts of data they are forced
to handle, many other types of companies—
banks, for example—need servers as well to han-
dle large amounts of data. 
Iceland is a particularly attractive place to
set up data farms. It has cheap electricity used
to run the servers, and its naturally cold envi-
ronment can alleviate overheating. Simply
put, running a cooling facility needs less energy
because of the already cold air. The way that data
farms work is that a single company owns the
server facility and leases out server capacity to
other companies. Because of economies of scale
in maintaining and cooling such server farms,
it can be less costly per unit storage capacity
to run huge farms than for individual compa-
nies to run their own independent servers. 
Iceland has negotiated one contract with
Verne Holding Company for a project slated to
begin operation in 2015 and has the potential
to create about 100 new jobs. (“Landsvirkjun to
Supply…”) The most important question to ask
about the development of another large-scale
industry is how big it will become. If data farms
become another booming industry, many of the
same problems currently present in the alu-
minum industry may reappear down the road.
Alternatively, having three big industries—fish-
ing, aluminum, and data farms—is better diver-
sification than having just two large indus-
tries. Having these three industries competing
with one another is an effective way to reduce
the overall risk to the economy. All three indus-
tries encompass different sectors and, combined
with smaller industries such as biotechnology
and ferrosilicon, Iceland will have a nicely diver-
sified portfolio and can effectively reduce its
dependence on aluminum.
Conclusions about the Aluminum
Smelting Industry in Iceland
The Icelandic economy has a long history
of dependence on one type of industry. For many
hundreds of years, that industry was fishing.
However, over the last half century, fishing
has been gradually overtaken by the aluminum
smelting industry as the largest export. As the
relative size of the fishing industry shrinks, both
the absolute and the relative size of the alu-
minum industry continue to grow. Analysis
shows that the aluminum industry is an
extremely beneficial industry for Iceland. It
has created jobs, increased corporate tax
income, and increased the overall economic
prosperity of the country. However, aluminum
is not without risk and many of these risks are
borne by the Icelandic nation. Thus it is key that
Iceland reduce its overdependence on the alu-
minum industry. The relative size of the alu-
minum industry in Iceland can be reduced by
increasing or introducing other industries in
Iceland. The cheap price of electricity makes this
possibility exceptionally appealing to energy-
intensive industries. By inviting them, Iceland
can help diversify its economy and bring further
prosperity to the country. 
Iceland took a great step forward when the
aluminum industry was introduced nearly 45
years ago to help diversify and stabilize the econ-
omy. But now it is time to take the next progres-
sive step. Diversification is necessary for further
growth and stability. Iceland has plenty of
energy to utilize, and doing so in new and cre-
ative ways will be what helps Iceland reach
that next level of economic prosperity.
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